China| Planet & Commerce
In a striking case of unequal treatment, the United States under President Donald Trump has imposed punitive trade measures on India for its surging imports of Russian oil — but spared China, the world’s largest buyer of Russian energy, from similar sanctions. The move exposes the cold logic of geopolitics: a blend of strategic necessity, economic interdependence, and political calculations that allows Washington to pressure one partner while treading lightly with another.
At the heart of the debate is a simple question: Why India and not China? The answer lies in the interplay between oil imports, global supply chains, rare earth minerals, and electoral politics.
Since the war in Ukraine began, Russia’s oil exports have become a lifeline for Moscow’s embattled economy.
This dramatic surge in Indian buying has angered US officials, who accuse New Delhi of profiteering from discounted Russian oil and even re-exporting refined products to global markets. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent bluntly labeled this the “Indian arbitrage,” claiming Indian refiners made $16 billion in excess profits in 2024 alone.
By contrast, Washington describes China’s role as less opportunistic, noting that Beijing’s share of Russian oil imports has risen only modestly, from 13% to 16% of its energy basket.
Trump has moved aggressively against India, slapping an extra 25% tariff — raising total duties to 50% — on Indian goods. The justification: India’s refusal to scale back Russian crude imports.
But when asked if he would extend similar penalties to China, Trump demurred:
“Well, because of what happened today, I think I don’t have to think about that. Now, I may have to think about it in two weeks or three weeks or something, but we don’t have to think about that right now,” Trump told Fox News on August 15.
Analysts suggest the president is buying time to negotiate a broader trade arrangement with Beijing, particularly on rare earth minerals — essential elements used in everything from smartphones to electric vehicles and missile systems.
Rare earths comprise 17 critical elements indispensable for modern manufacturing. China dominates 80–90% of the global mining and processing market. Without Chinese exports, US industries ranging from clean energy to defense contractors would face crippling shortages.
Thus, sanctioning China over Russian oil would risk triggering a rare earth embargo, hitting the US economy far harder than punishing India. This explains Trump’s selective restraint: rare earth leverage makes China untouchable, at least for now.
Another reason for Washington’s leniency toward Beijing is the calendar. The US retail industry is entering the holiday inventory season.
Retailers rely heavily on Chinese imports, and any spike in tariffs now could lead to Christmas price shocks, fueling inflation and voter discontent.
By contrast, trade with India is smaller and politically less sensitive, making it a safer target for Trump’s tough-on-Russia stance.
US officials have escalated rhetoric against India:
This framing paints India not just as a consumer but as a profiteer, thereby justifying punitive tariffs.
Not all US officials favor equal treatment. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that sanctions on China would raise global energy prices, since Chinese refiners process Russian crude and re-export products worldwide. Any disruption would ripple through global markets, harming US allies and consumers alike.
This risk strengthens the case for a “India-first” sanctions approach, sparing China despite its larger role in sustaining Moscow’s oil economy.
Beijing has defended its Russian energy purchases as legal and legitimate.
“The international community, including China, has conducted normal cooperation with Russia within the framework of international law,” said Liu Pengyu, spokesman for China’s embassy in Washington.
China frames its imports as lawful energy security, contrasting with Washington’s portrayal of India as a war profiteer.
The US and China have been locked in a bitter tariff war since 2023, with duties reaching near-embargo levels at one point.
With Beijing resuming limited rare earth exports under the truce, Washington has every incentive to keep negotiations on track — not derail them with oil-related sanctions.
India, unlike China, does not dominate global supply chains. Instead, it relies heavily on cheap Russian crude to:
For New Delhi, Russian oil has been an economic lifeline. But this dependence has also made it a convenient target for Washington’s sanctions strategy.
India faces the challenge of balancing ties with both Russia and the US, while defending its right to diversify energy imports.
The US approach underscores three realities:
In effect, Washington’s double standard reflects a hierarchy of interests: realpolitik over fairness.
Both economies remain deeply intertwined, making any tariff escalation risky. This interdependence reinforces Washington’s decision to spare Beijing while squeezing New Delhi.
The contrasting treatment of India and China over Russian oil imports illustrates the selective nature of US sanctions policy. Trump’s administration is pursuing political expediency, economic self-preservation, and strategic leverage, rather than applying uniform standards.
This unequal approach may alienate New Delhi, strain US-India ties, and complicate Washington’s efforts to build a united front against Moscow. But from the Trump administration’s perspective, the risks of confronting China outweigh the optics of fairness.
The result is a geopolitical balancing act where India shoulders the burden, and China walks free — for now.
China| Planet & Commerce
The global energy market has once again shifted under the weight of geopolitics. As India scales back its imports of Russian oil under growing pressure from the United States, China has stepped in opportunistically, ramping up purchases of discounted crude. Analysts say Beijing is seizing the moment to strengthen its refinery output and gain energy leverage while Moscow scrambles to find buyers.
This shift highlights how sanctions pressure, opportunistic buying, and geopolitical maneuvering are converging in the world’s biggest energy marketplace. With US President Donald Trump threatening secondary sanctions against countries importing Russian oil, the tug-of-war over Moscow’s exports is intensifying — leaving Russia, India, and China at the center of a strategic triangle.
India, which emerged as the largest buyer of Russian seaborne oil after Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has begun to scale back purchases. According to Reuters, Indian state refiners pulled out of importing between 600,000 and 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in recent weeks.
This pullback reflects multiple pressures:
Yet this pause has left Russia scrambling, since India had grown to import around 1.7 million bpd, far surpassing China’s daily intake of 1.2 million bpd.
Beijing has moved quickly to capitalize on India’s retreat. According to Kpler analyst Muyu Xu, Chinese refineries are showing their “opportunistic” side, buying Russian oil at $3 per barrel cheaper than Middle Eastern crude.
This opportunism aligns with China’s longstanding strategy: leverage market disruptions to secure cheap, long-term energy deals, ensuring both affordability and geopolitical leverage.
Despite China’s increased buying, experts warn that Beijing cannot fully replace India’s volumes.
As Xu points out:
“If India keeps holding off on buying, that’s going to be a real problem for Russia — China just can’t take on all of India’s volume by itself.”
For Moscow, this means China’s opportunism helps cushion the blow, but only partially. Russia risks losing its biggest new customer unless India returns to the market.
The imbalance between India and China’s treatment is striking.
When asked if Beijing would face sanctions, Trump said he may consider it “in two or three weeks.” Analysts believe this delay reflects Washington’s reluctance to disrupt ongoing US-China trade talks, particularly around rare earth minerals and holiday-season supply chains.
Thus, India has become the primary target, while China enjoys more room to maneuver — at least for now.
China’s opportunistic buying of Russian oil fits within a long-term energy security blueprint:
This combination allows China to act nimbly, absorbing more cargoes when others hesitate.
India, meanwhile, faces tougher constraints. Unlike China, it does not dominate critical sectors like rare earths, making it more vulnerable to US economic pressure.
This leaves India in a triple bind: how to keep oil prices low, maintain US goodwill, and preserve Russia ties — all without provoking sanctions.
For Russia, the divergence between India and China is both an opportunity and a vulnerability.
This dynamic makes Russia dependent on China in ways it might prefer to avoid, giving Beijing greater leverage in negotiations over pricing and long-term supply contracts.
The shifting balance has broader consequences:
The result is a new geography of oil flows, with Moscow more reliant on Beijing and India caught in Washington’s crossfire.
Several factors will determine how this story unfolds:
China’s opportunistic surge in Russian oil buying is both tactical and temporary. It allows Beijing to exploit cheap crude while India hesitates under US pressure. But as analysts stress, China cannot replace India’s full demand, leaving Russia exposed to volatile swings in Asian buying patterns.
In the long run, Washington’s selective sanctions policy risks alienating India while strengthening Beijing’s leverage. The contrast is stark: India is punished for buying Russian oil, while China profits by stepping in.
This episode illustrates how energy politics, economic opportunism, and geopolitical rivalry are reshaping the global oil market. Russia, once the world’s energy giant, now finds its fate tied not to Western capitals but to the shifting calculations of Beijing and New Delhi.
China| Planet & Commerce
Next month, Beijing’s Tiananmen Square will once again transform into a stage of immense historical and military significance. To commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, China is preparing a grand military parade, one designed not only to honor the past but also to signal the future of its military power.
According to official statements and state media reports, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will showcase a vast array of advanced weaponry — some of it revealed to the world for the very first time. Fighter jets, bombers, missile systems, early warning aircraft, tanks, and specialized anti-drone vehicles are expected to dominate the spectacle.
For China, the parade is more than a ceremonial display. It is a carefully choreographed projection of technological advancement, military modernization, and strategic readiness, sending a message to domestic audiences, adversaries, and allies alike.
The date chosen — September 3, 2025 — is highly symbolic. It marks eight decades since the formal surrender of Japanese forces in 1945, ending World War II in Asia. Known as “Victory Day” in China, the anniversary remains an important part of the national memory, highlighting the country’s sacrifices during the war and the rise of its role in global affairs thereafter.
This will be only the second time since 2015 that China has organized a full-scale military parade for this occasion. The 2015 event marked the 70th anniversary, drawing global attention with the participation of Russian President Vladimir Putin and dozens of foreign leaders. This year’s parade, too, will feature dignitaries from across the world, reinforcing China’s efforts to link its wartime legacy to its present geopolitical influence.
Chinese officials confirmed that the parade will highlight the PLA’s fourth-generation fighter jets, designed with stealth, maneuverability, and advanced avionics. Carrier-based aircraft, including those adapted for China’s expanding fleet of aircraft carriers, are also expected to be showcased.
Bombers with extended range capabilities may be included, symbolizing Beijing’s growing ability to project power far beyond its shores. Analysts suggest the PLA could use the parade to demonstrate advances in aerial refueling and precision strike technology.
The parade will feature China’s latest main battle tanks, reflecting upgrades in armor, firepower, and battlefield survivability. Security analysts told Reuters they anticipate seeing military trucks equipped with counter-drone devices, highlighting Beijing’s recognition of drone warfare as a critical element of modern combat.
Missile trucks, potentially carrying hypersonic and anti-ship missiles, will be a focal point. Such systems are designed to counter adversary navies, particularly the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, who have ramped up their presence in contested waters like the South China Sea.
Another key highlight will be early warning aircraft, designed to protect China’s carriers and extend its surveillance reach. These planes symbolize Beijing’s determination to develop system-based combat capability, integrating air, land, and sea forces into a unified network.
Xinhua reported that all equipment in the parade will be domestically produced active-duty weaponry, emphasizing China’s push for self-reliance in defense industries.
Unlike traditional parades, this event is deliberately framed as a demonstration of combat readiness. The Global Times stressed that formations will be organized to mirror real battlefield roles, rather than simply marching in ceremonial units.
This design serves three purposes:
By tying the event to the memory of World War II, Beijing is also drawing a line between its historical role as a victim of aggression and its current stance as a global military power prepared to deter new threats.
Western governments will be monitoring the parade closely, especially for insights into China’s missile programs and hypersonic weapons.
This combination of observation and concern ensures that the parade’s impact will reverberate far beyond Tiananmen Square.
President Xi Jinping will preside over the parade, reviewing 45 contingents of PLA troops over an estimated 70-minute ceremony. His presence reinforces a central message: the Communist Party’s direct control over the military and the PLA’s loyalty to the party’s leadership.
Xi has made military modernization a cornerstone of his rule, pledging to transform the PLA into a “world-class military” by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. This parade acts as a visual milestone, showing progress toward that ambitious goal.
Chinese authorities have stepped up security in downtown Beijing since early August, when the first parade rehearsals began.
Such extensive measures underscore both the sensitivity and scale of the event, reflecting Beijing’s determination to maintain order while showcasing strength.
Foreign military attachés and analysts anticipate several possible surprises at the parade:
If unveiled, these technologies could shift perceptions of China’s military balance with the United States and its allies.
Military parades are not new to China, but this one comes at a moment of rising geopolitical tension. The parade will be read not only as an anniversary commemoration but as a strategic statement in several directions:
Such layered signaling makes the parade a potent tool of both military diplomacy and political narrative building.
As China prepares to mark 80 years since the end of World War II, its massive military parade will do more than celebrate history. It will project a vision of the future — one where Beijing commands respect not just through economic power but also through advanced weaponry and system-based combat capabilities.
For the global community, the event will serve as a barometer of China’s military progress, a demonstration of its industrial self-sufficiency, and a reminder of its determination to claim a larger role on the world stage.
With the presence of global leaders, the unveiling of cutting-edge arms, and the echoes of history, the Victory Day Parade of 2025 will stand as one of the year’s most closely watched geopolitical spectacles — one that links China’s past struggles with its aspirations for the future.
China| Planet & Commerce
The United States military has been shaken by the conviction of a Navy sailor who sold sensitive information to Chinese intelligence officers, in what prosecutors described as an “egregious betrayal.” Jinchao Wei, who served aboard the USS Essex amphibious assault ship, was found guilty of espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, and unlawful export of defense-related technical data. He now faces sentencing on December 1, where he could receive decades in prison.
The conviction highlights growing concerns about Chinese espionage targeting the US military and comes amid a series of prosecutions involving sailors accused of leaking classified or sensitive data. While Wei was acquitted of naturalization fraud, the jury’s verdict underlined the seriousness of his actions, which US authorities said endangered both American lives and the country’s strategic security.
This article examines Wei’s case in detail, the methods used by Chinese intelligence, the vulnerabilities inside the US Navy, and the wider implications for US-China relations at a time of intense geopolitical rivalry.
Wei, a machinist’s mate responsible for operating and maintaining ship systems, was arrested on August 2, 2023 as he arrived for duty at Naval Base San Diego. According to the Justice Department, he had been recruited by a Chinese intelligence officer through social media in February 2022.
Over the next 18 months, Wei provided his handler with a steady stream of classified and restricted materials, including:
For his betrayal, Wei received more than $12,000 in payments. When confronted by the FBI after his arrest, he admitted his role and reportedly said: “I’m screwed.”
Wei was convicted on three critical charges:
He was acquitted of naturalization fraud, a charge that alleged he lied during his path to US citizenship.
Federal prosecutors emphasized the gravity of his crimes. Adam Gordon, US attorney for the Southern District of California, declared:
“By trading military secrets to the People’s Republic of China for cash, he jeopardized not only the lives of his fellow sailors but also the security of the entire nation and our allies.”
The Justice Department said the conviction was a reminder that espionage threats remain real and that traitors will be pursued relentlessly.
Wei’s recruitment demonstrates the adaptability of Chinese intelligence operations. Social media platforms were used to approach him, exploiting his vulnerabilities and offering financial incentives.
This reflects a broader pattern of Chinese espionage, which often relies on cultivating relationships online, appealing to financial needs, or exploiting dual loyalties. Once inside, officers encourage targets to provide small pieces of information before gradually escalating requests to sensitive or classified data.
In Wei’s case, the method proved effective: in less than two years, he was transmitting troves of information critical to US Navy operations.
Wei’s conviction is not an isolated incident. Around the same time in California, another sailor, Wenheng Zhao, pleaded guilty to conspiring with Chinese intelligence and receiving a bribe. Zhao was sentenced to more than two years in prison.
The near-simultaneous arrests of Wei and Zhao suggest that China has systematically targeted lower-ranking sailors, who often have access to sensitive ship operations but are less likely to be under intense scrutiny than higher-ranking officers.
Such cases reveal vulnerabilities in military vetting and monitoring systems. While the US military maintains strict security protocols, financial stress, personal grievances, and ideological manipulation can still leave personnel susceptible to recruitment.
The USS Essex is an amphibious assault ship, designed to deploy Marines, aircraft, and landing craft in expeditionary operations. It plays a central role in Indo-Pacific naval strategy, where the US Navy frequently conducts exercises aimed at deterring Chinese influence.
By providing technical manuals and operational data on the Essex, Wei gave Beijing insight into:
Such intelligence could help China develop countermeasures in the event of hostilities, making Wei’s betrayal particularly damaging.
Espionage cases like Wei’s underline the human and strategic costs of betrayal. The price of information sold—$12,000—was minuscule compared to the potential risks: compromised missions, exposed vulnerabilities, and threats to allied navies operating alongside the US.
The Justice Department’s prosecution sends a clear message, but the broader question is whether such incidents represent isolated failures or a systemic security gap. Analysts warn that China’s aggressive espionage campaigns are not slowing down and that the US must invest more heavily in counterintelligence and personnel monitoring.
The conviction comes at a time of heightened US-China tensions:
Cases like Wei’s add to the distrust clouding bilateral relations, reinforcing US perceptions of China as a hostile actor bent on undermining American security.
For allies in Europe and Asia, the conviction also highlights the risks of Chinese infiltration into military systems, raising pressure to tighten counterespionage efforts.
The conviction of US Navy sailor Jinchao Wei marks one of the most serious espionage cases in recent years, exposing both the vulnerabilities of military personnel and the persistence of Chinese intelligence efforts.
By selling sensitive information for a modest sum, Wei compromised the security of his shipmates, his country, and its allies. While his sentencing on December 1 will deliver accountability, the broader challenge for the Pentagon lies in preventing future breaches and ensuring that other personnel cannot be similarly exploited.
As the Justice Department stressed, the betrayal was a grave violation of trust—one that illustrates the stakes of modern espionage and the enduring contest between Washington and Beijing in both intelligence and military domains.
China| Planet & Commerce
In a symbolic and politically charged move, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a rare visit to Tibet to mark the 60th anniversary of Beijing’s formal consolidation of rule over the Himalayan territory. State media portrayed the event as a festive celebration, with nearly 20,000 officials, military personnel, and locals greeting Xi in Lhasa with bouquets, flags, and choreographed dances. Yet behind the pomp lies a contentious history, deep-rooted grievances, and the simmering issue of Tibet’s political status and religious freedom.
Xi’s visit is significant not only because of its rarity—his last trip was in 2021—but also because it comes at a sensitive time. The Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader who fled after the 1959 uprising, recently turned 90 and reiterated that his reincarnation will be decided “exclusively” by his office. Beijing, however, insists it holds the right to approve his successor, a stance that threatens to inflame future tensions both in Tibet and abroad.
At the same time, Tibet remains strategically crucial to China’s geopolitical posture, particularly in relation to India, its hydropower ambitions, and its broader quest to control border regions. Xi’s speech in Tibet, emphasizing “political stability, ethnic unity, and religious harmony”, highlights Beijing’s drive to tighten its grip through Sinicisation policies while showcasing its development projects.
This article examines the political symbolism of Xi’s visit, Tibet’s contested history, China’s development strategies, the Dalai Lama succession issue, and the implications for Sino-Indian relations and broader regional geopolitics.
Xi Jinping arrived in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, to a meticulously staged welcome. According to Xinhua News Agency, about 20,000 people from “all ethnic groups and all walks of life” lined the streets.
Xi declared that the goal was to build a “modern socialist Tibet that is united, prosperous, civilised, harmonious and beautiful.” He also stressed the need to “guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt itself to socialist society”, signaling Beijing’s continued push to bring religion under tighter state control.
The backdrop to Xi’s visit is a long and bitter dispute over Tibet’s status. China claims the region has been part of its territory for centuries, citing historical ties to the Yuan and Qing dynasties. However, many Tibetans and international historians argue that Tibet functioned as an independent or semi-independent entity for much of its history.
The turning point came in 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled into exile in India following a failed uprising. From Dharamshala, he established a government-in-exile, which continues to advocate for Tibetan rights and autonomy.
For many Tibetans, China’s rule has meant political repression, religious restrictions, and demographic change as large numbers of Han Chinese migrated into the region. Xi’s visit thus symbolizes Beijing’s attempt to reinforce its legitimacy in the face of lingering discontent.
During meetings with regional officials, Xi emphasized four priorities:
Xi’s remarks reflect the Communist Party’s long-standing policy: to ensure Tibet remains firmly under Beijing’s control through development, ideological guidance, and security measures.
Beijing’s stance on Tibetan Buddhism is particularly contentious. Xi called for “guiding” the religion to adapt to socialism, a euphemism for state oversight of monasteries, restrictions on religious teachings, and control over the Dalai Lama succession.
Perhaps the most sensitive shadow looming over Xi’s visit is the question of the Dalai Lama’s succession. The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is 90 years old. He has stated that his office will decide his successor, without interference from Beijing.
China, however, insists that it has the final authority to approve the reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, citing historical precedents of imperial involvement. Critics say this is part of Beijing’s strategy to install a compliant figurehead who would serve its political agenda in Tibet.
The prospect of dueling Dalai Lamas—one recognized by Beijing and another by the Tibetan exile community— could spark global disputes, particularly with India, which hosts the current Dalai Lama.
Xi also reiterated support for the Yarlung Tsangpo dam project in Tibet, calling for its “vigorous, orderly, and efficient” completion.
The project underscores how Tibet is not only a religious and cultural battleground but also a strategic resource hub, central to China’s environmental, economic, and military goals.
Xi’s Tibet visit coincided with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to India, where both sides pledged to mend relations strained by the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which left troops dead on both sides.
Tibet sits at the core of the Sino-Indian rivalry:
Xi’s visit was thus not only a domestic show of control but also a signal to New Delhi that Tibet remains a red line for Beijing.
Tibet remains largely closed to journalists and foreign observers, making it difficult to independently verify conditions. However, human rights groups have long accused Beijing of:
Xi’s message of harmony contrasts sharply with reports of repression. His omission of any mention of the Dalai Lama during the visit is also telling, as Beijing seeks to erase his influence domestically while waiting for a succession it can control.
Xi Jinping’s rare visit to Tibet to celebrate 60 years of Chinese rule was a carefully staged display of power and legitimacy. While state media highlighted parades, dancers, and declarations of unity, the underlying tensions surrounding Tibet’s history, religion, and geopolitical role remain unresolved.
From the looming Dalai Lama succession crisis to hydropower disputes with India, Tibet continues to be a strategic fault line at the intersection of religion, culture, and geopolitics. Xi’s emphasis on political stability and Sinicisation demonstrates Beijing’s intent to keep the region firmly under control, but it also reveals the limits of its acceptance among Tibetans who still yearn for greater autonomy or independence.
As the world watches, the struggle over Tibet is far from over—it is simply entering its next chapter under China’s most powerful leader in decades.
China| Planet & Commerce
In the heart of South Asia’s turbulent geopolitics, China has stepped into a delicate balancing act: trying to reconcile Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban while simultaneously safeguarding and expanding its flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At a trilateral meeting in Kabul, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi sat alongside Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar and the Taliban’s Amir Khan Muttaqi, projecting a carefully choreographed image of regional cooperation.
This was not the first such gathering. Just twelve weeks earlier, Beijing had hosted the same trio, signaling a new phase of China’s diplomatic ambitions. For Beijing, these talks are about far more than mere neighborhood diplomacy; they are about securing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), countering militant threats, and ensuring that investments in Pakistan and Afghanistan do not collapse under the weight of instability.
But China’s role as peacemaker is fraught with risk. Pakistan and the Taliban, once close allies, have become bitter neighbors, accusing each other of harboring militants and destabilizing the border. China’s challenge is to transform its economic leverage into political trust—a task far easier said than done in a region plagued by mistrust, violence, and shifting alliances.
This article explores the history of Pakistan-Taliban relations, China’s CPEC-driven motives, the security challenges on both sides of the border, and whether Beijing truly has the clout—or the appetite—to make peace last.
The trilateral meeting took place against a backdrop of fast-changing regional power balances. Once, Pakistan was the Taliban’s chief patron, offering sanctuary, intelligence support, and strategic guidance. In return, the Taliban were seen as Islamabad’s proxy in Afghanistan, capable of countering Indian influence.
But since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, relations have soured. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of providing sanctuary to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a group carrying out deadly cross-border attacks. Kabul, meanwhile, condemns Pakistan for its heavy-handed policies, particularly its expulsion of Afghan refugees, which many Afghans view as collective punishment.
Meanwhile, the wider regional chessboard is shifting:
This web of overlapping interests complicates China’s efforts. To succeed, Beijing must prove it can navigate these rivalries without alienating either side.
Launched in 2015, CPEC was branded as a “game-changer” for Pakistan, promising $62 billion in roads, ports, and power plants stretching from Xinjiang to Gwadar Port. For China, it was a cornerstone of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a way to open trade routes, secure energy supplies, and project influence deep into the Indian Ocean.
But a decade later, CPEC faces mounting challenges:
China’s dream of extending CPEC into Afghanistan, where infrastructure is desperately needed, faces even steeper obstacles. Banks and state-owned enterprises are reluctant to invest in a country where stability is absent and security risks remain overwhelming.
Despite the risks, Beijing persists. Analysts argue that China sees three main incentives in reconciling Pakistan and the Taliban:
As one Pakistani diplomat put it: “For China, a peaceful neighborhood is essential. Development and connectivity cannot be achieved in the absence of security.”
China’s biggest obstacle is not diplomacy—it is the entrenched violence on both sides of the Durand Line.
These realities explain why Beijing is pushing Islamabad and Kabul to reconcile. Without improved ties, both CPEC and China’s broader BRI ambitions will remain underdeveloped and underutilised.
For their part, the Taliban reject Pakistan’s accusations. They insist they are not providing safe havens to militants and deny formal links to the TTP. Instead, they argue that Pakistan’s internal instability is to blame for its rising violence.
The Taliban are also seeking recognition on the international stage. By engaging with China, they gain a degree of legitimacy while showing defiance toward Islamabad. This makes reconciliation even trickier—the Taliban see themselves as equals now, not dependents of Pakistan.
The million-dollar question is whether China can go beyond facilitation and act as a guarantor of peace.
As one Pakistani diplomat told Al Jazeera: “China certainly can play guarantor, because of the trust it enjoys. But whether it would do so remains to be seen.”
Even if China nudges Pakistan and the Taliban closer, serious hurdles remain:
Without addressing these issues, trilateral summits risk becoming photo opportunities rather than substantive breakthroughs.
China’s attempt to reconcile Pakistan and the Taliban is emblematic of its broader ambitions: to cement itself as a regional power broker, safeguard its Belt and Road investments, and counter the militant threats emanating from South Asia.
But the road ahead is perilous. Pakistan’s security crisis is deepening, Taliban relations are fraying, and militancy shows no sign of abating. CPEC, once touted as a game-changer, remains under strain.
For Beijing, the challenge is deciding whether to merely mediate talks or to step into the far more demanding role of guarantor of peace. The former preserves its image as a helpful neighbor; the latter risks drawing China into conflicts that have consumed empires before.
As it stands, China can facilitate dialogue—but whether it can make Pakistan and the Taliban genuine friends again remains an unanswered question hanging over South Asia’s future.
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