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Netherland | Planet & Commerce 

The Netherlands awoke on Thursday to a political cliffhanger after a knife-edge general election that left Geert Wilders’ far-right Freedom Party (PVV) neck and neck with the liberal-progressive D66, but with the populist firebrand facing near-total isolation in coalition talks. With 99.7% of ballots counted, both parties were projected to win 26 seats each in the 150-member Dutch Parliament, separated by a razor-thin margin of about 15,000 votes, with D66 narrowly ahead after Amsterdam’s late count. The result marks one of the most dramatic electoral turnarounds in recent Dutch history, signaling a shift toward centrist and pro-European politics after a turbulent year of right-wing dominance. “It’s incredibly tense,” said Rob Jetten, the 38-year-old D66 leader and likely frontrunner for prime minister. 

“We have to wait for the next few hours—or days—for the final results. But I’m very confident that we can build a new coalition for stability and progress.”

The vote, which saw record turnout among young and urban voters, positions D66 as the moral and political counterweight to Wilders’ brand of anti-Islam populism and nationalism.

Once the dominant figure on the Dutch right, Geert Wilders finds himself politically cornered despite a strong showing at the ballot box. His Freedom Party (PVV), which won 37 seats in 2023 and briefly led a chaotic right-wing coalition, lost significant ground after the government collapsed in less than a year—triggered by Wilders’ hardline immigration stance that alienated moderate allies. Now, all mainstream parties have ruled out working with him, effectively shutting him out of government formation, even if his party ends up slightly ahead when the votes of 90,000 overseas Dutch nationals—which historically favor D66—are finalized early next week.

“Whichever way the final count goes, Wilders has no viable coalition path,” said Sarah de Lange, political scientist at the University of Leiden. “He has become a victim of his own radicalism. The system rewards consensus, not chaos.”

Wilders, however, refused to concede defeat. “As long as there’s no 100% clarity on this, no D66 scout can get started,” he wrote on X. “If the PVV is the largest party, we will do everything we can to ensure we lead the next government.”

At just 38 years old, Rob Jetten has emerged as the face of a new centrist era in Dutch politics. A former climate minister and professional athlete who once competed for the national youth track team, Jetten has been dubbed “the anti-Wilders” for his calm, optimistic demeanor and inclusive rhetoric. He is poised to become the Netherlands’ first openly gay prime minister, a symbolic moment in one of Europe’s most socially progressive societies. Analyst Leonie de Jonge of the University of Tübingen noted that Jetten’s “positive, calm, and constructive” campaign message resonated with voters fatigued by years of populist anger. “He appealed to both centre-left and centre-right voters who wanted competence, stability, and decency,” she said. D66’s platform emphasized climate action, economic modernization, European cooperation, and social inclusivity, presenting a stark contrast to Wilders’ anti-immigration and Eurosceptic agenda.

Under the Netherlands’ proportional representation system, no single party ever wins a majority. The coalition-building process, often stretching for months, is now expected to be even more complex given the fragmented results. Analysts see the most viable path as a broad D66-led coalition comprising the Christian Democrats (CDA), the liberal-conservative VVD, and the centre-left GL/PvdA alliance—a combination that would yield 86 seats, a working majority of ten. The CDA, led by the youthful Henri Bontenbal, saw a strong revival, nearly quadrupling its seats from 5 to 18, on a campaign promising “decent, respectful politics” after the instability of the Wilders era. The VVD, long the party of former Prime Minister Mark Rutte, finished third with 22 seats, two fewer than last time. Its new leader, Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius—a former refugee from Turkey—has re-established the VVD as a centre-right stabilizing force, making it a crucial coalition partner. The GL/PvdA alliance, however, suffered a setback, falling from 25 to 20 seats, prompting the resignation of its leader Frans Timmermans, a former European Commission vice-president. His departure could make negotiations with the VVD smoother, as the conservatives had previously refused to govern under his leadership.

The D66 surge was powered by a disciplined, optimistic campaign, focused on uniting the country after years of political division. De Lange credited the party’s message of “hope, responsibility, and forward-looking governance” with attracting voters from both the left and right.

“Voters wanted to send a signal for stability and a centrist government,” she explained. “D66 managed to project competence without arrogance—a rare combination.”

The party’s record-breaking 26 seats—up from just nine in the outgoing parliament—mark its strongest-ever showing in six decades. Founded in the 1960s as a pro-European reformist movement, D66 has evolved into a technocratic yet socially liberal force advocating green policies, digital innovation, and civil liberties.

Geert Wilders’ decline, however, does not necessarily signal the end of the far-right surge in Europe. Political scientists caution that far-right sentiment remains strong among Dutch voters disillusioned with mainstream politics.

“Wilders’ personal setback doesn’t mean populism has peaked,” said de Jonge. “If you add up votes for all far-right parties—the PVV, Forum for Democracy (FvD), and JA21—they’ve actually gained one seat as a bloc.”

Wilders’ Freedom Party, known for its anti-Islam rhetoric and opposition to EU integration, remains a symbolic force, even as it loses influence in coalition politics. His brief stint leading the government last year ended in collapse when he clashed with allies over his proposal to ban asylum entirely and restrict dual citizenship, a policy that drew condemnation across Europe.

Forming a new government in The Hague will not be quick or easy. The traditional “scout process”—where a representative of the largest party begins sounding out coalition partners—has already been delayed until Tuesday, as officials wait for final vote tallies, including those from Dutch citizens abroad. If D66 officially emerges as the largest party, Rob Jetten will be tasked with forming what could become one of the broadest centrist coalitions in modern Dutch history. If the PVV edges ahead by a narrow margin, Wilders may attempt to claim the initiative, but his isolation among mainstream parties makes any government formation virtually impossible. “The Netherlands is entering a period of delicate negotiations,” said analyst Peter Kranenburg.

 “Coalition talks could last months, as ideological differences between D66, VVD, and CDA remain significant—particularly on fiscal policy, immigration, and EU integration.”

The Dutch election is being closely watched across Europe as a litmus test for the strength of liberal democracy amid rising populism and disinformation. After years of turmoil and short-lived governments, the 2025 vote appears to mark a resurgence of centrist, pro-European politics in the Netherlands. European leaders hailed the outcome as a victory for moderation and democratic stability. 

“The Dutch people have chosen unity over division,” said an EU official in Brussels. “This sends a powerful message across the continent that democracy and decency still win.”

The election also reaffirms the Netherlands’ long tradition of coalition governance, where compromise and pragmatism outweigh polarization—a model that many European democracies now view as a stabilizing force.

Even if D66 succeeds in forming a coalition, the new administration will inherit a daunting list of challenges:

• A housing crisis affecting young and low-income citizens.
   
• Pressure to meet EU climate targets while maintaining industrial competitiveness.
   
• Rising migration tensions that continue to fuel far-right sentiment.
   
• Economic inequality between urban and rural regions.
   

“The next government will have a hell of a job to pick up the pieces,” said de Jonge. “Public trust in politics is at an all-time low, and the new coalition must prove that pragmatic governance can deliver results.” Still, for now, the mood among D66 supporters is one of cautious optimism. As Jetten told reporters, “The Netherlands has shown that hope and unity can win over fear and anger. That’s the country I want to lead.”

Africa| Planet & Commerce 

Uganda has emerged as the latest country to sign a controversial deportation deal with the United States, agreeing to temporarily host third-country nationals expelled under President Donald Trump’s aggressive immigration crackdown. The agreement, confirmed by Kampala’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been framed as a “temporary arrangement” but already raises sharp questions about trade, sovereignty, and human rights.

While Washington hails the pact as part of its global campaign to “remove uniquely barbaric criminals” and unwanted migrants, analysts argue Uganda’s decision is driven less by humanitarian considerations and more by economic and diplomatic expediency. Facing tariffs on key exports and growing international isolation after its anti-LGBTQ+ law of 2023, Kampala appears eager to get back into Washington’s good books ahead of the 2026 elections.

In a statement issued Thursday, Bagiire Vincent Waiswa, permanent secretary of Uganda’s Foreign Ministry, confirmed that Kampala had struck a deal with Washington to host certain deportees from the US.

Key points of the arrangement include:

• Uganda will not accept individuals with criminal records.
   
• The country will not host unaccompanied minors.
   
• Kampala “prefers Africans” be transferred as part of the deal.
   
• The arrangement is temporary, with no timelines yet announced.
   

“The two parties are working out the detailed modalities on how the agreement shall be implemented,” the ministry said.
 

The US State Department later confirmed that President Yoweri Museveni discussed the deal with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, alongside negotiations on “migration, reciprocal trade, and commercial ties.”

Just a day earlier, Uganda’s Foreign Minister Henry Okello Oryem had denied the reports, insisting Uganda lacked facilities to accommodate deportees.

“We are talking about cartels: people who are unwanted in their own countries. How can we integrate them into local communities in Uganda?” he told the Associated Press.
 

Yet, within 24 hours, Kampala’s narrative flipped, signaling that tariffs, visas, and sanctions relief were likely part of the behind-the-scenes bargaining.

Although the Foreign Ministry’s statement did not specify quid pro quos, officials and analysts suggest Uganda is eyeing several benefits:

1. Tariff Relief
    
   • Uganda faces 15 percent tariffs on goods entering the US, part of Trump’s protectionist trade war.
      
   • Exports most affected include coffee, vanilla, cocoa, and petroleum products.
      
   • Kampala hopes hosting deportees will unlock tariff reductions, boosting competitiveness against suppliers like Colombia.
      

1. Restoration of Preferential Trade Access
    
   • Uganda was suspended from AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) in 2023 after passing its anti-LGBTQ+ law.
      
   • Deportee cooperation may help Uganda negotiate re-entry or at least limited tariff-free concessions.
      

1. Renewed Aid and Diplomatic Leverage
    
   • Washington froze aid for HIV/AIDS programs and imposed visa bans on Ugandan officials.
      
   • The deportee deal could soften relations and bring back critical funding.
      

1. Political Legitimacy Ahead of Elections
    
   • With elections due in January 2026, Museveni is eager for Western acceptance to counter accusations of authoritarianism.
      
   • The deal projects Uganda as a “responsible partner” to the US.
      

Rights advocates argue the deal amounts to outsourcing human suffering for trade benefits.

Nicholas Opiyo, a leading Ugandan human rights lawyer, condemned the arrangement:

“We are sacrificing human beings for political expediency. That I can keep your prisoners if you pay me; how is that different from human trafficking?”
 

Opposition lawmaker Muwada Nkunyingi said the deal was designed to “clear Museveni’s image” before elections, warning the US not to ignore Uganda’s human rights abuses.

Trump’s administration has vowed to deport millions of undocumented migrants, labeling some “uniquely barbaric monsters.”

Rights groups say the policy disproportionately targets African countries with weak human rights protections. Melusi Simelane of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre told Al Jazeera:

“The US is treating Africa like a dumping ground, focusing on countries where rights are already fragile.”
 

Ironically, Uganda already has one of the world’s most progressive refugee policies. It hosts 1.7 million refugees from South Sudan, Sudan, and the DRC, allowing them to work and move freely.

The UNHCR has praised Kampala’s open-door stance. Yet, critics note the contradiction: while Uganda is lauded for supporting refugees, it is now agreeing to take in deportees rejected by their own governments.

Relations between Uganda and the US soured sharply after Museveni signed the anti-homosexuality bill in 2023.

• The US accused Kampala of “gross human rights violations.”
   
• Aid cuts targeted crucial HIV programs.
   
• Uganda was banned from AGOA.
   
• Visa restrictions were imposed on officials accused of undermining democracy.
   

The deportee deal may represent Kampala’s first step toward repairing ties, even as rights groups insist Washington must not overlook ongoing abuses.

Uganda is not alone. Several countries have quietly struck similar deportation deals:

• Eswatini: Accepted five deportees from Vietnam, Jamaica, Laos, Cuba, and Yemen in July, reportedly in exchange for tariff reductions.
   
• South Sudan: Took eight deportees, including convicted murderers and drug traffickers, after a US Supreme Court ruling.
   
• Rwanda: Agreed to host 250 deportees, offering workforce training, housing, and health care — echoing its controversial but lucrative UK migrant deal.
   
• El Salvador: Received 300 Venezuelan migrants for a $6 million fee.
   
• Costa Rica: Took 200 asylum seekers from Asia and Africa.
   
• Panama: Accepted nearly 300 deportees in February.
   

This trend highlights how the US uses economic leverage to secure cooperation from smaller states.

Neighbouring countries have raised alarms. South Africa summoned Eswatini’s diplomats in August, worried that violent offenders sent there could destabilize the region.

Uganda may face similar scrutiny, especially given its porous borders and history of hosting rebel groups and proxy wars.

Hosting US deportees may bring short-term gains, but it carries risks:

• Integration challenges: Communities may reject non-African deportees.
   
• Security threats: Some deportees may have criminal pasts not disclosed by the US.
   
• Political backlash: Citizens may see the deal as “selling sovereignty for coffee prices.”
   
• International reputation: Uganda could be viewed as complicit in Trump’s harsh deportation agenda.
   

The deportee deal reveals a harsh reality of global politics: trade concessions are being tied to human lives.

For Trump, the deals demonstrate “toughness on immigration.” For Museveni, they offer a pathway to tariff relief and political rehabilitation. But for deportees, the arrangement leaves them in legal limbo — neither recognized as refugees nor fully accepted as residents.

Uganda’s decision to accept deportees from the US underscores the intersection of migration policy, trade, and political survival. In exchange for hosting people unwanted elsewhere, Kampala hopes to reduce tariffs, revive exports, and restore Western legitimacy.

But the price is steep: the arrangement risks turning Uganda into a dumping ground for unwanted migrants, while glossing over its own human rights record.

As elections approach in 2026, Museveni is betting that Washington’s goodwill will outweigh domestic dissent. Yet, the question lingers: will the short-term gains of tariff relief and aid outweigh the long-term costs of sacrificing rights and sovereignty?